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The Education Article of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution: Selected Policy Issues for
Consideration and Debate at the Next
Constitutional Convention
B.

DOUGLAS ANDERSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Education Article of the Illinois State Constitution, Article
X, is one of the briefest in the document. Yet it deals with a subject
which is of paramount importance to our society: the development of
future generations of citizens-those who will be responsible for our
democratic way of life, our culture in all its diversity, and the
preservation and evolution of those values which underpin our society.
The record of proceedings of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention,' the convention of 1969 which drafted the present Constitution, demonstrates that the education of our youth is a topic which
engenders caring, concern, and conflict among people who must
articulate the principles which will provide the framework for the
government of our state. If there is to be a constitutional convention
at the end of this decade, then the language articulating the purposes,
governance, and financing of public education merits reconsideration.
We must be certain those principles reflect what we really mean to
say, what we believe and are committed to, for they will shape the
new generations not only in and for the complex world we at present
vaguely comprehend, but also for the unknown dimensions of the
twenty-first century.
The Constitution of 1870 contained its article on public education
at Article VIII and contained additional relevant provisions at Articles
*
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INOGs, (1972) [hereinafter RECORD
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IV, V, and IX. 2 Article X of the present Constitution has three
2. ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. VIII:
§ 1. The general assembly shall provide a thorough and efficient system
of free schools, whereby all children of this state may receive a good
common school education.
§ 2. All lands, moneys, or other property, donated, granted or received
for school, college, seminary or university purposes, and the proceeds
thereof, shall be faithfully applied to the objects for which such gifts or
grants were made.
§ 3. Neither the general assembly nor any county, city, town, township,
school district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any church
or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy,
seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian domination whatever; nor shall any grant
or donation of land, money, or other personal property ever be made by
the state or any such public corporation, to any church, or for any sectarian
purpose.
§ 4. No teacher, state, county, township or district school officer shall
be interested in the sale, proceeds or profits of any book, apparatus or
furniture used or to be used in any school in this state, with which such
officer or teacher may be connected, under such penalties as may be provided
by the general assembly.
ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. IV:
§ 22. The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any
of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: for . . . Providing for the
management of common schools; . . . Granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise
whatever.
In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no
special law shall be enacted.
ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. V:
§ 1. The executive department shall consist of a . . . superintendent of
public instruction . . . who shall . . . hold his office for the term of four
years from the second Monday of January next after his election and until
his successor is elected and qualified. They shall . . . reside at the seat of
government during their term of office, and keep the public records, books
and papers there, and shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by
law.
ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. IX:
§ 3. The property of the state, counties, and other municipal corporations, both real and personal, and such other property as may be used
exclusively for . . . school . . . purposes, may be exempted from taxation;
but such exemption shall be only by general law.
§ 12. No county, city, township, school district or other municipal
corporation, shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any
purpose, to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate
exceeding five percentum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be
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sections. Section 1 articulates general principles on the goals and
purposes of the state system of public education; the analogous
provisions were at Section 1 of Article VIII of 1870. Additionally,
the current Section 1 says the state has the primary responsibility for
funding public education. Section 2 provides for the election of a
State Board of Education with the duty to appoint a chief state
educational officer; the prior mechanism was found at Section 1 of
Article V of 1870. Formerly the Superintendent of Public Instruction
had been elected since an act of 1845; the elective position was
terminated at the conclusion of the term of office of the last elected
state superintendent on January 1, 1975. Section 3 prohibits the use
of public funds for sectarian purposes; the identical provision was at
Section 3 of Article VIII of 1870.
At the last constitutional convention, the Education Committee
proposed the following changes to Article VIII of the 1870 Constitution:
1. that Section #1 be reworded;
2. that a new Section #2 creating a State Board of Education
be inserted and that the Superintendent of Public Instruction
be eliminated as an elected office;
3. that section #3, prohibiting the use of public funds for
sectarian purposes be retained; and
3
4. the elimination of Section #2, 3, and 4.
This paper will only briefly touch on Section 2 of Article X,
which provides for the election of a State Board of Education and its
appointment of the chief state educational officer, or Section 3 of
Article X, which repeats the language of the 1870 Constitution
prohibiting the use of public funds for sectarian purposes. 4 These are
ascertained by the last assessment for state and county taxes, previous to
the incurring of such indebtedness. Any county, city, school district, or
other municipal corporation incurring any indebtedness as aforesaid, shall
before, or at the time of doing so, provide for the collection of a direct
annual tax sufficient to pay and discharge the principal thereof within twenty
years from the time of contracting the same.
3. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, vol. VI at 225.
4. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 2(a):

2.(a) There is created a State Board of Education to be elected or selected
on a regional basis. The number of members, their qualifications, terms of
office and manner of election or selection shall be provided by law. The
board, except as limited by law, may establish goals, determine policies,
provide for planning and evaluating education programs and recommend
financing. The Board shall have such other duties and powers as provided
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important topics but beyond the primary scope of this article.
The main question under Section 2 would be whether the system
of electing a State Board of Education, rather than appointing the
Board, and appointing the Superintendent of Public Instruction,
rather than electing that officeholder, has functioned as the delegates
expected it to. That would be a lengthy study which merits attention
but which is not possible to fully address here.'
Section 3 was retained without change partly because delegates
felt it would be too controversial to tamper with the language.
Obviously the topic of separation of church and state remains at the
center of controversy. Witness the recent spate of litigation across the
country brought by the religious right and the rise of political activism
of such groups, as well as suits brought to challenge alleged funding
of sectarian related activities. 6 Some might argue that Section 3 is
superfluous in light of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, that federal cases applying that language adequately prevent
the use of public monies for religious purposes. However, others
could argue that the Illinois language is more specific and more
restrictive than the First Amendment's prohibition. Undoubtedly,
should there be a constitutional convention, debate on the churchstate issue will engender intense feelings. An adequate treatment of
by law.
ILL.

CONST. art. X,

§ 3:

3. Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town, township,
school district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any church
or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy,
seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any
grant or donation of land, money, or other personal property ever be made
by the state, or any such public corporation, to any church, or for any
sectarian purpose.
5. It is interesting to note that at the time of the 1969-70 convention election
of state school boards was definitely the minority position; thirty-five states had
boards appointed by the governor and seventeen had boards elected by the people or
representatives of the people. U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION 60-61 (1974), cited in W. VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLS, (2d ed. 1987).
6. Articles and law suits readily attest to the continuation of widespread
disputation. See, e.g., Mozart v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d
1058 (6th Cir. 1987); Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir.

1987). See also generally, Lawsuit Challenges Chapter 1 and 2 Aid to Church Schools,
VII Education Week 14, (Dec. 19, 1987); Prayer at Sports Events is Challenged, VII
Education Week 13, (Dec. 2, 1987); Americans United Moves to Stop Iowa Tax

Break for Parents, 15 School Law News 22, (Oct. 29, 1987); and the list could
continue for pages.
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the issues would require a lengthy treatise and is also beyond the
scope of this article.
II.

POLICY LANGUAGE OF SECTION ONE

This essay will devote its attention to Section 1, for statements
of purpose and policy are often those most subject to ambiguity
(deliberate or otherwise), to potential misinterpretation, and to the
continued need for debate on public policy.
Section 1 of Article X provides as follows:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the
educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities.
The state shall provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services. Education
in public schools through the secondary level shall be free.
There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the
7
system of public education.
The Record of Proceedings:Sixth Illinois ConstitutionalConvention shows that the Committee on Education wanted to emphasize
"that education is the most important function of state and local
government." ' The language submitted by the Committee on Education was different than that finally adopted by the delegates to the
convention. The Committee had proposed the following language:
The paramount goal of the people of the State shall be
educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities.
To achieve this goal, it shall be the duty of the State to
provide for an efficient system of high quality public education
institutions and services.
Education in the public schools through the secondary
level shall be free. There may be such other free education as
the General Assembly provides. 9
This was quite a change from the existing language of the 1870
Constitution. '0
7.
8.
9.
10.

ILL. CONST. art. X, §1.
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, Vol. VI at 231.
Id. at 227.
For the language of the 1870 Constitution, see supra note 2.
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The Convention debated the merit of making education a "paramount" goal." Delegates questioned whether such a statement indicated a priority of the state and would impose a mandate on the
Executive branch and the General Assembly to provide for education,
perhaps at the expense of everything else. Testimony indicated it was
the intention of the Committee to give a mandate to carry out this
goal.' 2 Although the delegates debated such niceties as whether education was to be "a paramount goal" or "the paramount goal,"
neither phrase was adopted. The Committee's language was rejected
and education became merely" a fundamental goal" of the state.
One can speculate that had education been labeled a paramount
goal, which as noted in the constitution debates means "first" or
"foremost," perhaps litigation requiring its funding, or requiring
budget cuts in other areas before cutting public education, would have
ensued. 3 As enacted, though, Section 1, which provides that a fundamental goal of the state is the educational development of all
persons to the limits of their capacities, has been held by the courts
to be a statement of general philosophy rather than a mandate that
certain means be provided in any specific form.' 4 Thus, this portion
of the Illinois Constitution appears to be interpreted as being an
expression of general philosophical aspiration, not as creating any
duty on the government. However, as will be suggested infra, perhaps
this language needs to be discussed again in light of other legal
developments.
The Committee found Secton 1 of Article VIII of the 1870
Constitution faulty because some terms used were imprecise in meaning, e.g., "children," "good," and "common school."' 5 The Committee noted that the terms had been frequently tested in court due
to their ambiguity and cited Braden and Cohn's The Illinois Consti6
tution: An Annotated and ComparativeAnalysis as evidence of such.
The current provision avoids the problem of having the courts
define "children" or "common schools," but it opens the door for
litigation to clarify "persons" and "to the limits of their capacities."
11. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, Vol. II at 762-802.
12. Id. at 766.
13. This is not the same issue as requiring the state to be primarily responsible
for funding public education, which will be discussed infra.
14. O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of School Dist. No. 23, 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
15. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, vol. VI at 232.
16. Id. at 232, citing G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN
ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYsIs

(1969).
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"Persons" obviously includes adults-not just individuals over the
age of eighteen, but also, for example, those over the age of twentyone and over the age of forty. Could an adult who has not completed
public schooling lay claim to a right to attend public secondary schools
in order to complete his or her education? The constitutional right to
an education "to the limits of one's capacity" raises not simply
technical questions of assessment but also complex questions of policy
in the area of special education.
III.

"To THE LIMITS OF THEIR CAPACITIES"

Intentionally or not, the Committee anticipated a development in

the area of special education, and the language of Section 1 opens
the door for policy and legal debate which remain to be resolved. The

question is: "To what extent are handicapped persons entitled to

educational services and what are the applicable standards for educational services?" Prior to 1970, the Illinois courts had held that
state schools for the mentally incompetent were charitable and hospitable institutions and were not part of the common school system,
and thus there was no obligation to provide free school training for
the mentally incompetent.' 7 The Committee stated specifically that it
was seeking to expand the scope of coverage to include the handicapped:
[T]he objective that all persons be educated to the limits of
their capacities would require expansion beyond the traditional
public school programs. It recognizes the need of the person
with a physical handicap or mental deficiency who nevertheless
is educable. Adults, too, may profit from further formal
education. The objective is to provide each person an opportunity to progress to the limit of his ability. 8
In order to provide education to handicapped children, Congress
enacted the Education of All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), still
often referred to as Public Law 94-0142.19 The EHA requires states
and local educational agencies (i.e., school districts) which receive
17. Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15 I11.
2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265 (1958).

18. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, Vol. VI at 234. Adults would
appear to be entitled to education through the secondary level under the literal terms
of Sec. I and according to the Committee's recommendation. Arguably, new residents
from foreign shores, migrants, functional illiterates, drop-outs, or any adult with less
than a high school diploma could enjoy, not the mere privilege of night classes, but
the right to a free secondary-level public education.
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et. seq. (1976).
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federal monies to provide a free appropriate public education to every
identified handicapped child. 20 The potential interrelationship of this
federal law and Section 1 of Article X of the Illinois Constitution
2
merits consideration. '
In Pierce v. Board of Education,22 Section 1 was found not to
impose a duty on boards of education to place students in special
education classes since the article was not self-executing. 23 However,
in addition to the federal requirements under the EHA, Illinois has
state legislation providing for special education. 24 Thus, there are
federal and state statutes which execute the provision and give bases
for implementing a duty to provide special education.
Special education litigation raises the reoccurring question: "What
is the free education to which one is entitled?" The open question
for special education under Section 1 is whether the phrase, "to the
limits of their capacities" imposes an actual standard for public
educational institutions to meet or whether it is merely a "philosophical" statement.
The EHA requires for each handicapped child the development
of an "individualized education program" (IEP). 25 The IEP sets forth
the instructional goals and objectives as well as the educational and
related services which will constitute the "free appropriate public
education." 26 In litigation under the EHA, there is frequently a dispute
between the parents of a handicapped child and the educational agency
as to whether an appropriate educational plan is being offered.
Generally the parents are seeking the best possible educational services
for their child, perhaps a high-cost residential placement, while the
school district is proposing a plan with more modest components
which it argues is, nonetheless, an "appropriate" education. For
example, a school district may offer instruction in a self-contained
class in an elementary school with support services while the parents
may desire placement in a private residential facility. According to
the Supreme Court in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson v.
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976).
21. A nice treatment of the background to the EHA and its purposes is found
in Miller and Miller, The Education for All HandicappedAct: How Well Does It

Accomplish Its Goal Of Promoting The Least Restrictive Environment For Education,
28 DEPAUL L. REV. 321 (1979).
22. 69 Ill. 2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977).
23. Id. at 92, 370 N.E.2d at 536.
24. State special education statutes are found at ILL.
14-1.01 et seq. (1985).
25. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9), 1414(2), (5) (1982).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18),(19) (1982).

REV. STAT.

ch. 122, para.
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Rowley, 27 Congress intended the EHA to create a basic floor of

educational opportunity for disabled children but did not require the
child be provided the best possible education:
In explaining the need for federal legislation, the House Report
noted that 'no congressional legislation has required a precise
guarantee for handicapped children, i.e., a basic floor of
opportunity that would bring into compliance all school districts with the constitutional right of equal protection with
respect to handicapped children.' [Cite omitted.]. . . Assuming
that the Act was designed to fill the need identified in the
House Report - that is, to provide a 'basic floor of opportunity' consistent with equal protection-neither the Act nor its
history persuasively demonstrates that Congress thought that
equal protection required anything more than equal access.
Therefore, Congress' desire to provide specialized educational
services, even in furtherance of 'equality,' cannot be read as
imposing any particular substantive educational standard upon
the States.
[Thus the lower courts] . . .erred when they held that the Act
requires New York to maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided
2
nonhandicapped children. 1

IV.

A

HIGHER STANDARD

The interesting question is whether Illinois has imposed upon
itself a duty to provide a higher level of services (more than a basic
floor of opportunity) by virtue of the constitutional provision which
sets forth as a goal "the educational development of all persons to
'29
the limits of their capacities."
A "free appropriate public education" is defined in the EHA in
relevant part:
The term "appropriate public education" means special education and related services which (A) have been provided at
public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State education
agency, . . .10
27. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176 (1982).

28. Id. at 200.
29. ILL. CONST. art. X, §1.

30. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
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One could argue that Section 1 of Article X establishes the standard
for education as the limits of a child's capacities. The Court in Rowley
found that the EHA did not establish a standard of maximizing the
potential of each handicapped child."a However, the holding does not
preclude a state from imposing a higher standard on itself.
In David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee" the federal appellate court held that state standards requiring special education
programs to assure maximum possible development would be incorporated into the federal EHA. Specifically the court accepted the
district court's reasoning that:
[S]ince Massachusetts law mandated a level of substantive
benefits superior to that of the federal Act [EHA], the state
standard would be utilized as determinative of what was an
'appropriate' education for the child. 3
In Illinois, the two-stage argument would be: first, that Section
1 of Article X sets the standard for educational services to be provided;
and second, such a higher standard is enforceable under the federal
EHA. It does not appear that this specific argument has been addressed by the state or federal courts in Illinois.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois has considered the "free education" provision of Article X as
applied to the handicapped child under the EHA, but was not
presented with the "limits of their capacities" question.3 4 In a subsequent case involving the same parties, the court found that the state
regulations enacted pursuant to the EHA do not confer greater rights
for a particular type of service than those mandated directly by the
EHA.33 However, the court was presented only the question of the
state regulations as drafted; it was not presented the issue of whether
Article X of the Illinois Constitution itself imposes a higher standard
than that of the EHA.16 Subsequent litigation between the parties
dealt with reimbursement for services unilaterally incurred by the
31. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982).

32. 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986).

33. Id. at 423.
34. See Max M. v. Thompson 566 F.Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The Illinois
state courts had previously decided that sec. 2 of art. X requires that the special

education programs established by the legislature be free of tuition through the

secondary level. Elliot v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 64 Ill. App. 3d 229, 380 N.E.2d
1137 (1978).
35. Max M., 592 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
36. To a great extent the state regulations merely mirror the federal require-

ments and impose no higher standards or obligations.
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parent under the Burlington School Committee v. Dept. of Education3 7
doctrine, but the issue of a state constitutional standard for services
38
was not addressed.
V.

"MERE PHILOSOPHY" OR AN ENFORCEABLE PRINCIPLE

Although O'Connor v. Board of Education of School District
No. 2339 is cited for the proposition that Section 1 of Article X,
providing that a fundamental goal of the state is the educational
development of all persons to the limits of their capacity, is a
statement of general philosophy rather than a mandate, the case was
actually a school athletics sex discrimination case and was citing to
Pierce v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago"0 for authority."
However, Pierce was a 1977 special education case which was not
decided under the EHA, in which the court held that Article X,
Section 1 is not "self-executing. ' 42 Its articulation that Section 1 is
only a statement of general philosophy is, at best, dictum. Pierce, in
turn relied upon Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist. ,'43 which had

absolutely nothing to do with any constitutional provisions pertaining
to public education. Sullivan was a public immunity and liability
insurance case, and contains no opinion on any Education Article of

37. 471 U.S. 359 (1985). In Burlington, the Court found a unilateral change of
placement by parents did not constitute a waiver of the parents' right to reimbursement for expenses of private placement. Otherwise parents would be forced to leave
their child in what may be an inappropriate educational placement or to obtain
appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for reimbursement. Id. at 372.
38. Max M., 629 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. I11. 1986).
39. 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
40. 69 I11.2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977).
41. O'Connor, 645 F.2d at 582.
42. Pierce, 69 1Il.2d at 92, 370 N.E.2d at 536. The court stated that:
The article is not self-executing. Its pronouncement of the laudable goal of
"the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities"
is a statement of general philosophy, rather than a mandate that certain
means be provided in any specific form. Similar provisions of both the 1970
Illinois Constitution and its predecessor, the 1870 Constitution, have been
so interpreted. (See Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist. (1972) 51 111. 2d 274,
277, 281 N.E.2d 659). Whether the Board had the duty to place the plaintiff
in a special education class, therefore, can only be ascertained by examining
the applicable statutes and regulations governing the administrations of
special education facilities in this State.
Id.
43. 51 111. 2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972).
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the Illinois Constitution establishing purposes or standards of education, past or present. 4
Thus the federal courts in Pierce and O'Connor misconstrued
Illinois law regarding the Education Article. Moreover the question
of the "self-execution" of the provision is no longer relevant now
that both federal and state statutes impose duties regarding the
provision of educational services to handicapped children. Therefore,
the "limits of their capacities" as a standard for the provision of
services for education development of all citizens remains one which
could well be relitigated.
The possibility that Section 1 of Article X imposes a standard
for services which may be litigated is being raised for discussion in
the context of providing educational services to handicapped children
because the EHA provides an administrative and judicial review
process for disputes regarding the provision of such services. Thus,
there is a ready forum which has been and is frequently used for the
protection of the rights of handicapped children. It is conceivable that
the "to the limits of their capacities" language could be raised in
contexts in addition to special education.
For example, there is attention being paid to the educational
needs of "gifted" students. 45 The parents or guardians of educationally gifted children could argue that school districts are failing in their
constitutional responsibilities if a sufficiently enriched and stimulating
education, at least through the secondary level, is not provided to
academically talented children. Finally, what is the appropriate remedy
if the state fails to educate one to the limits of one's capacity?
Mandatory remediation? Provision of services to adults? Damage
actions?

VI.

Do

CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES CREATE NEW TORTS?

This raises a related issue upon which to speculate: whether
setting the goal of educational development of all persons to the limits
of their capacities opens the door for establishing the as yet unrecognized tort of "educational malpractice." In the seminal case, Peter
W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 6 a high school graduate
44. Id. The case addressed remedies for damage in light of immunities. It
considered § 19 of art. II and § 22 of art. IV of the Constitution of 1870, and
referred to art. VIII, Sec. 12 of the 1818 Constitution and art. XIII, Sec. 12, of the
1848 Constitution, but not art. VIII of the 1870 Constitution. Id.
45. Witness, for example, the creation of the state Math/Science Academy and
the rise of "gifted" education programs.
46. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
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sued the school district from which he graduated on a theory of
educational malpractice because his functional educational level was
far below that of the twelfth grade. The court refused to recognize
educational malpractice as a cause of action, in part, because there
was no standard of care owed. 47 Other courts have followed the
reasoning of Peter W. and have refused to recognize educational
48
malpractice as an actionable claim.
However, a plaintiff's attorney in Illinois might argue not only
that the Illinois Constitution establishes a right to an education, 49 but
also that Section 1 sets a standard to be attained against which a
school district's execution of the duty owed can be measured. On its
face such an argument at least merits debate. 0 Complicating the
problem in Illinois, and adding additional bricks to buttress an
educational malpractice claim, is the fact that educational reform is
resulting in express criteria and educational objectives." Schematically, the argument would be that there is a duty to educate grounded
in both the state constitution and statutes, and that there are both
constitutional standards, i.e., the limit of one's capacity, and standards defined by the State Board of Education. Thus, Illinois may
have opened the door to educational malpractice claims, as the policy
considerations upon which other states refused to recognize such a
claim may have been eliminated by an express articulation of the duty
and standard. 2
It appears, then, that Section 1 of Article X merits reconsideration
and debate because the phrase "to the limits of their capacities" may
establish a constitutional standard requiring the recognition of edu47. Id.

48. D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554
(Alaska 1982); Hoffman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400
N.E.2d 317 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440,
391 N.E.2d 1352 (1979); Tubell v. Dade Co. Public Schools, 419 So.2d 388 (Fla.
App. 1982); Smith v. Alameda Co. Social Serv. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 153
Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979).
49. There is, of course, no federal constitutional right to education. See San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
50. Even courts which have not found a cause of action in educational
malpractice have reserved a possible exception for gross violations of defined public
policy. See e.g., Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 445, 391 N.E.2d at 1354.
51. See, for example, the reforms initiated in the Education Reform Package
of 1985 as embodied in S.B. 730, H.B. 1070 and 1985 Ill. Laws 1351.
52. This discussion does not raise or consider the complex problem that arises
in special education where there may be allegations of malpractice based on misdiagnosis or misplacement. See, e.g., Zirkel, Educational Malpractice: Cracks in the
Door? 23 EDUC. L. REP. 453 (1986).
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cational malpractice claims in Illinois, and also may establish a higher
standard for the provision of services to handicapped children to be
incorporated and enforced under the federal EHA. It was the stated
intent of the framers that this language would necessitate expansion
of services beyond the customary school programs. 3 Given such an
expansive goal, the courts should be open to creative claims for new
and diverse high-quality service:
[Tihe language of Section 1 be in harmony with the rising
expectations of the people of Illinois for the maximum development of persons of every level of competence, highest to
lowest, and be consistent with the expansion of educational
4
experiences that may occur in the decades ahead.
Given the expansive language and noble intent, it is surprising
that the provisions have not been subject to more frequent and more
vigorous litigation over almost two decades by the handicapped, the
gifted, those who feel the school systems have failed to provide
adequate education, and adults who lack twelfth-grade academic and
vocational skills. 5 Whatever form such claims might take, they all
would entail additional expense to the system of public education.
VII.

FINANCING THE GOALS

The financing of any state function tends to be controversial,
and the financing of public education has not been immune from
debate.5 6 The financing of public education was a matter of debate at
the Sixth Constitutional Convention which resulted in paragraph 3 of
Section 1 of Article X, viz., "The State has the primary responsibility
for financing the system of public education." 57
At the convention, the Education Committee originally introduced language which dealt with the financing of public education in
much more specific terms:
53. "[Tlhe second paragraph of the proposed revision includes authorization
for educational services which are not necessarily school, or institutionally related."
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, vol. VI at 235.
54. Id. at 233.

55. "Adults, too, may profit from further formal education. The objective is
to provide each person an opportunity to progress to the limit of his ability." Id. at
234.

56. The Illinois General State Aid formula was subject to sunset provisions to
be effective August 1, 1987, by Public Act 84-126. However, the failure to create a
new formula or the means for funding one has resulted in the postponement of such
termination 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-132 (West).

57.

ILL.

CONST. art. X, §1.
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To meet the goals of Section 1, substantially all funds for the
operational costs of the free public schools shall be appropriated by the General Assembly for the benefit of the local
school districts. No local governmental unit or school district
may levy taxes or appropriate funds for the purposes of such
educational operation except to the extent of ten percent (10%7)
of the amount received by that district from the General
Assembly in that year. 8
Re-occurring elements in any policy debate on financing public
education include consideration of the burden on local taxpayers,
particularly property holders; inequality of resources at local levels,
resulting in inequality of education between richer and poor communities; and the balancing of state versus local control, the fear on the
local level that if financing is from the state then the state will impose
its wishes on the local communities.5 9 The majority report of the
Education Committee recognized the problem of inequality inherent
in local financing:
A salient fact of Illinois school finance is the enormous
inequality among the districts with respect to their resources
from local tax receipts. 6°
Throughout the 1960's, social critics, educators and economists chal-,
lenged local property tax financing of public education as being antidemocratic because it made educational opportunity unequally dependent upon the accident of one's place of residence. 61 The Education
Committee showed cognizance of these arguments in its report:
Thus, the quality of education received by any student in the
State is largely a product of the accident of the wealth of his
district. In poorer districts, the citizens must impose a greater
tax burden upon themselves in order to achieve the same level
62
of spending as wealthier districts.
58. The Illinois General State Aid formula was subject to sunset provisions to
be effective August 1, 1987, by Public Act 84-126. However, the failure to create a

new formula or the means for funding one has resulted in the postponement of such

termination. 1987 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-132 (West).
59. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, Vol. VI at 295.
60. Id. at 296-97.
61. For a scholarly discussion of the impact of variation in wealth upon the
education available, in the same time period of the Sixth Constitutional Convention,
See generally J. COONS, W. H. CLURE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION,

62.

(1970).

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 1, vol. VI at 297.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

The majority of the Education Committee advocated a shift to
state-wide financing as the means of relief from property tax escalation.61 The majority argued its proposed language would address the
problem of balancing local control and equality of resources:

In conclusion, the committee is convinced that this proposal
maximizes the attainment of two objectives which otherwise
seems [sic.] to be mutually self-contradictory-the equalization

of educational opportunity statewide and the maintenance of

local control. 64
A minority of the Education Committee dissented from the
proposal that substantially all funds for the operational cost of the
free public schools be appropriated by the General Assembly. The

minority favored increased state support for free public schools and

acknowledged the inequalities which exist in the resources of local
school districts and the burden on property taxpayers but thought it
both unnecessary and unwise to include such language in the Constitution.6 5 The minority feared that such language would lead to increased state control and would result in a leveling of schools. 66 A
limitation on local support to 10076 of the appropriations of the

General Assembly would decrease educational services in those schools
where districts were funding special programs; in short, it might
improve inferior schools but would lower education in better schools.6 1
The debate continued and various amendments were proposed. 61
Ultimately, after substantial debate, the language of the majority
report was defeated. 69 The constitutional debate embodied all the
63. "If the State should take over most of the cost of operating the elementary
and secondary schools, the tax burden would be shifted to state tax revenues, probably
to the income tax." RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, vol. VI at 298.
64. Id. at 299.
65. Id. at 300.

66. Id. at 301-02.
67. Id. at 302.
68. See, e.g., the Bottin Amendment, which would have limited funding by
local taxation to not exceed 50% of total funding (introduced RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, vol. IV at 3550, defeated RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1,
vol. IV at 3552) and the Parker Amendment which would have provided that the
"General Assembly shall raise and distribute revenue from sources other than ad
valorem property taxes to the extent of 90 percent of the average total cost of public
education as determined by the state board of education." (introduced RECORD OF
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, Vol. IV, at 3547, defeated RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 1, Vol. IV, at 3550).
69. Mathias' motion to delete said language introduced RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, Vol. IV, at 3553, and adopted RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 1, Vol. IV, at 3570.
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policy considerations which raged at that time and which, arguably,
are still before us. Equitable and effective financing of public education remains a matter of deep concern nationwide and merits renewed
debate. At this time however, the debate must include additional
factors.
In the two decades since the Sixth Constitutional Convention
rural property values have plummeted, America's worldwide leadership in education has been challenged and the schools have absorbed
even more functions than they had before. Therefore, education as
the means to personal and national survival and progress is even more
crucial. Also, the courts have expressed themselves on the financing
of public education so that the public may need to reconsider how it
wishes to articulate its principles regarding financing K-12 education.
In 1971, a decision of the California Supreme Court was hailed
by educators nationwide as resolving the issue of the inherent inequality in local financing of education. In Serrano v. Priest7 the state
supreme court held that a public school financing system which relied
heavily on local property taxes and caused substantial disparities
among individual school districts in the amount of revenue available
per pupil insidiously discriminated against the poor and violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The right to an
education in public schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be
conditioned on wealth; discrimination in school financing based on
the wealth of the districts because of the fortuitous presence of
commercial and industrial establishments is invalid.7 This decision
remains worthwhile reading because of the court's summation of the
opposing positions which are still currently debated. Although the
decision was greeted as a landmark which would result in nationwide
revision of school funding schemes and initiate equal educational
opportunity, it had little impact because of a subsequent 1973 United
States Supreme Court decision.
In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,72 MexicanAmerican parents of school children who were poor or resided in
school districts having a low property tax base brought suit alleging
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found sizable differences in the value of assessable
property between local school districts and opined that growing
disparities in population and taxable property between districts were

70. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
71. Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13.

72. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of
expenditure for education. 73 The Court found education is not among
the rights afforded explicit protection under the Federal Constitution,
that poverty is not a suspect classification, and left the problem of
74
inequities in school finance to the individual states to address.
Once again Illinois needs to debate these positions regarding
financing public education and especially to address the deepening
inequities between local school districts, which the current school aid
formula-whose demise is on hold-has not effectively ameliorated.
If there is a 1989-90 constitutional convention, then a provision on
this topic must be considered.
The present language in paragraph three of Section 1 of Article
X, provides only that, "The State has the primary responsibility for
financing the system of public education. ' ' 75 At the time of the
adoption of this provision the State's contribution to finance public
education was approximately 30.74% 76 Shortly after the adoption of
the 1970 Constitution, taxpayers brought an action to declare invalid
provisions of the school code pertaining to furnishing state funds to
local school district. In Blase v. State,7 7 the plaintiff's position was
that the constitutional phrase, "the primary responsibility for financing," required the state to provide at least 51% of the funds for
public education.78 The opinion of the court indicates that it considered portions of the Record of Proceedings of the Sixth Illinois
Constitutional Convention to determine the intent of the delegates in
drafting this language. 79 The court relied on statements introducing
73. Id. at 7-9, 15-16.
74. Id. at 28, 54-59.
75. ILL. CONST. art. X,

§ 1.

76. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, STATE, LOCAL, AND FEDERAL FiNANCING FOR ILLINOIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 3 (1985-86) shows the state, local, and federal

percents of funding at that time as:
YEAR
1972-1973
1971-1972
1970-1971
1969-1970

1968-1969
1967-1968
1966-1967

STATE
36.72%
37.42%
39.61%
30.74%

27.94%
27.13%
25.04%

77. 55 Ill. 2d 94, 302 N.E.2d 46 (1973).

LOCAL
57.23%
56.70%
54.00%
64.5107o

66.42%
67.8407o
68.89%

78. Id. at 96, 98-100, 302 N.E.2d at 47-49.
79. Id. at 98, 302 N.E.2d at 48.

FEDERAL
6.05%
5.88%
6.39%
4.75%

5.64%
5.03%
6.07%
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this amended language in which the delegate proposing it described it
as:
... in the Convention's usual fashion, horatory. I do not
believe that it states a legally enforceable duty on the part of
the state through the General Assembly, or otherwise. 0
The court concluded:
In view of the history of the proposal and the repeated
explanations of its principal sponsor, it cannot be said that
the sentence in question was intended to impose a specific
obligation on the General Assembly. Rather its purpose was
to state a commitment, a purpose, a goal. 8'
Thus "primary responsibility for financing" has been deemed to be
merely horatory in nature-a goal not a duty.
Although there is not a constitutional duty on the General
Assembly to provide 51 % of the financing of public schooling there
are recent developments which indicate the concern is not dead. In
the present session of the General Assembly there is a bill pending,
SB-1530, which requires the state to fund 51016 of the cost of elemen2
tary and secondary education beginning with the 1988-89 school year.
The reality is that if the trend of the past two decades continues the
state will be picking up 50076 of the tab for education. From 1966 to
1986 the state's percentage of financing increased form 25.04% to
40.97% while the local communities percentage decreased from 68.890
to 51.71%.13
VIII.

ARE INEQUITIES INHERENTLY INEFFICIENT?

Although Blase appears to have disposed of the state's primary
responsibility by calling it a goal, one could suggest that the issue is
not dead. If it is a goal as determined by the Illinois Supreme Court,
one may ask, "How long can a goal go unrealized before there arises
a duty to achieve it?" There is an interesting argument which would
relate the requirement on the state to "provide for an efficient system
of high quality public educational institutions and services," with its
"primary responsibility" to finance education.
80. Id. at 99, 302 N.E.2d at 49 quoting RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note
1, Vol. V, at 4145-49.
81. Blase v. State, 55 111.
2d at 94, 100, 302 N.E.2d 46, 49 (1973).
82. S.B. 1530, 85th Gen. Assembly (1987-88).

83. STATE, LOCAL,
supra note 76, at 3.

AND FEDERAL FINANCING

FOR ILLINOIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
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One could argue that a state system which does not correct wide
discrepancies in local funding so as to provide equality of educational
opportunity is failing to meet its obligation to provide an efficient
system of public education. 4 In a New Jersey case attacking funding
statutes and considering New Jersey's constitutional requirement of a
"thorough and efficient system of free public schools," the court
found the statutory scheme had no relation to equal educational
opportunity because of the discrepancies in dollars spent per pupil."5
Even if there is not a federal constitutional right to education, there
is an equal protection entitlement for those rights granted under the
state law. Where the state's constitution (1) provides for a fundamental goal of the educational development of all persons to the limits of
their capacities, (2) requires an efficient system of high quality public
educational institutions and services, and (3) imposes on the state the
primary responsibility for financing the system of public education,
it should be possible to find that a state funding mechanism which
allows disparate funding so that not all persons are receiving services
that promote educational development to the limits of their capacities
is an inefficient system and violative of Section 1 of Article X of the
1970 Illinois Constitution and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
IX.

SUMMARY

This article has limited itself to discussing policy questions raised
by a review of Section 1 of Article X, which establishes the goals,
purposes of, and financial responsibility for, public education. Litigation subsequent to the enactment of the 1970 Constitution requires
that there be some consideration of whether to modify certain provisions of Article X. Specifically the phrases "to the limits of their
capacities" and "primary responsibility for funding" in Section I
need to be pondered. Do they mean what they appear to say? Are
they mere horatory values to guide but neither goals to be attained
nor standards against which to judge performance? Would a new
convention choose to state that they should be taken literally or
choose to abrogate them entirely? Should the courts have viewed any
constitutional principle as merely "philosophical" and not as imposing
duties and responsibilities upon the government and investing rights
84. See, Rathe, Dividing the Pie More Evenly: Post-Rodriguez-Judicial Alternatives to School Financing in Illinois, 6 Loy. U. Cm. L. J. 110 (1975).

85. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 516, 303 A.2d 273, 296, cert. denied, 414

U.S. 976 (1973).
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in the governed? Statements at a convention could address Pierce's
misconstruction. Rhetorically and by contrast, one might ask if those
principles of the Bill of Rights, which underline our way of life, were
viewed as mere philosophical goals and not rights of the people to be
protected by the courts, how different would our social system be.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "constitution" as follows:
In American law. The written instrument agreed upon by the
people of the Union or of a particular state, as the absolute
rule of action and decision for all departments and officers of
the government in respect to all the points covered by it, which
must control until it shall be changed by the authority which
established it, and in opposition to which any act or ordinance
of any such department or officer is null and void. s6
At any future constitutional convention, in any debate on the goals,
purposes and financing of public education, the delegates should
make it clear that whatever language is agreed upon that language
establishes rights and obligations, not mere "pie-in-the-sky" phrases
to be dismissed by the courts as philosophical.

86. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 272 (5th ed. 1979).

